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ADMIRALTY-CHARTER PARTIES-LABIUTY FOR DxmURRAGE.-Exportation of
coal to Argentina, except under license issued by the Secretary of Commerce,
was forbidden by a proclamation of July 9, 1917 (40 Stat at L. 1683). Subse-
quently, the respondents chartered vessels of the libelant for tie purpose of
carrying on the restricted trade. The charter parties included demurrage pro-
visions. Failure of the respondent to secure licenses, because the War Trade
Board to whom the power to issue licenses had been transferred disapproved of
the consignees, resulted in delay beyond the lay days. The libelant sued for
demurrage. Held, that the libelant should recover. The Marpesia (1923, C. C. A.
2d) 292 Fed. 957.
Damages in the nature of demurrage are recoverable for unreasonable delay,
even in the absence of an express provision in the charter party or bill of lading.
Middleton v. United States (1923, E. D. S. C) 286 Fed. 548; Price v. Morse Iron-
works & Dry Dock Co. (I902, E. D. N. Y.) i2o Fed. 445. Such a recovery is
limited to the actual pecuniary loss suffered. The Conqueror (1897) 166 U. S.
110, 17 Sup. Ct. 51o. Express provisions for demurrage after the expiration of
specified lay days create an obligation excusable only in exceptional cases.
Hagan v. Cargo of Lumber (i9o8, E. D. N. Y.) 163 Fed. 657 (default of owner);
Crossman v. Burill (igoo) 179 U. S. 100, 21 Sup, Ct. 38 (vis major). And to
come within a provision expressly exempting the charterer from demurrage
liability under certain circumstances, the event provided for must be the proximate
cause of the delay. Romney Steamship Co. v. Archibald M'Neil & Sons Co.
(1921, D. Md.) 273 Fed. 287; Actieselskabet Barford v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber
Co. (19o3, S. D. Ga.) 125 Fed. 137. It has long been held that failure of the
charterer to procure documents necessary for the shipping or landing of a cargo
does not excuse delay. Hill v. Idle (1815, N. P.) i Starkie, Iii; Coast Steamship
Co. v. Seaboard Transportation Co. (1923, C. C. A. Ist) 291 Fed. 13. A provision
exempting the charterer from liability for delay due to governmental regulation
would probably be effectual in such a situation. See Coast Steamship Co. v. Sea-
board Transportation Co., supra, at p. 18. The doctrine of frustration excuses
performance of contracts where conditions arise which could not reasonably have
been foreseen. The Kronprinzessin Cecilie (1917) 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490;
Wright, Impossibility of Performing Conditions in Admiralty (1923) 23 COL. L.
REv. 4o. But it has no appjication in the instant case, since both parties knew that
licenses were required for the proposed exportation of coal. For general discus-
sions of demurrage, see Maclachlan, Merchant Shipping (5th ed. 1911) 578;
Leggett, Charter Parties (1894) 5oo; Scrutton, Charter Parties and Bills of
Lading (8th ed. 1917) 305; Abbott, Merchant Ships and Seamen (i 4 th ed. 19ol)
296.
AYLIENS-CANCELLATON OF CERTIFICATE OF NATuRALIzATIoN.-In a suit brought
by the United States under Sec. I5, Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat at L. 6oi) to
cancel the defendant's naturalization certificate on the ground that it had been
fraudulently obtained, in that he had not then had the intention to become a perma-
ment resident of the United States, it was shown that within five years after his
nauralization. the defendant, a British born subject, went to South Africa to
represent a New York firm; that he resided there ever since; that he stated an
intention to return to the United States whenever recalled by his employer; that
he voted and took an active part in local South African affairs; that in 192o he
made a short visit to the United States on a British passport. Held, that it was
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not proved that the defendant had changed his domicile by that clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt, which is required to cancel a
grant of citizenship. United States v. Knight (z923, D. Mont.) 291 Fed. 129.
A naturalization certificate will be cancelled when obtained without exact
compliance with the statutory requirements. United States v. Ginsberg (1917) 243
U. S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422. Also if the applicant was not of good moral character.
United States v. Milder (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 284 Fed. 571. Or if he has been
guilty of fraud, as in obtaining naturalization while a member of the I. W. W.
United States v. Swelgin (1918, D. Or.) 254 Fed. 884. Or when holding
anarchistic views. United States v. Stuppiello (i919, W. D. N. Y.). 260 Fed.
483; cf. (i92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 56I. During the war the courts cancelled
the certificates of a number of Germans who expressed sympathy for the "father-
land" on the theory that this revealed a mental reservation when they renounced
allegiance to the German Emperor at the time of naturalization. These decisions
seem legitimate where the naturalization was recent and the disloyalty patent.
United States v. Kramer (i919, C. C. A. 5th) 262 Fed. 395; Schurmann v. United
States (r92o, C. C. A. 9th) 264 Fed. 917. But when the naturalization occurred
thirty or more years before, the retrogressive presumption indulged in by the
court is explainable only on the grounds of excessive war zeal. Cf. United States
v. Darmer (i918, C. C. W. D. Wash.) 249 Fed. 989; United States v. Wurster-
barth (I918, D. N. J.) 249 Fed. 908; but see (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 84.
Though five years' continuous residence prior to naturalization is required, mere
temporary absence with intent to return does not break the continuity. United
States v. Jorgensen (I916, W. D. Mich.) 241 Fed. 412; United States v. Shanahan
(1916, E. D. Pa.) 232 Fed. 169; but see In re Di Giovine (1917, W. D. N. Y.)
242 Fed. 74i; United States v. Griminger (i916, N. D. Ohio) 236 Fed. 285.
Attempted naturalization in another country during such absence does break the
continuity. United States v. Simon (igo9, C. C. D. Mass.) 17o Fed. 68o. Where
a naturalized citizen within five years after the issuance of his certificate goes
abroad to reside, unless solely to represent American business, or for health,
education, or some special exigency, thus overcoming the presumption of expatria-
tion, his certificate may be cancelled. United States v. Ellis (i91I, C. C. E. D.
La.) I85 Fed. 546. Actual return to the United States rebuts the presumption of
expatriation created by the residence abroad. (i9IO) 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 504;
contra: United States, ex rel. Anderson, v. Howe (I916, S. D. N. Y.) 231 Fed.
546; see (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 195. The reasonable attitude of the
court in the instant case, though at variance with the reasoning of some of the
decisions, seems to represent the desirable attitude toward the cancellation of
citizenship papers. The defendant's recent acts might indicate an intent to
expatriate, but the representation of American business suggests that the intent
was not formed when naturalization was granted. For a discussion of fraud in
naturalization, see Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915)
secs. 225, 228-230.
BILLS AND NoTES-MAxER'S DEFENSE To UNmATURED NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS-INJUNCTION AGAINST TRANsFER.-The plaintiffs executed promissory
notes for electrical equipment sold by the defendants with an express warranty of
fitness. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the negotiation of the notes, alleging that
the equipment as delivered was defective and that the defendants had fraudulently
represented that they would deliver additional equipment. To prevent circuity,
they also requested recoupment by way of counter-claim against the notes. Held,
that the defendant's demurrer be sustained, since in the absence of an allegation
of the defendant's insolvency, the remedy at law is adequate. Howser Bros. v.
Tonson (192.3, Ga.) II9 S. E. 313.
Where the maker's defense to a negotiable instrument is cut off by a transfer to
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a holder in due course, he has a remedy at law against the transferor. Bourke v.
Spaight (igog) 8o Kan. 387, 1O2 Pac. 253; 27 L. R. A. 519, note. But where the
instrument is obtained by fraud, and is in the hands of a payee or a holder with
notice, its negotiation will be enjoined unless the remedy at law is certain and
complete. Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co. (1895) 156 Ill. 397, 40 N. E. 971; Pere
Marquette R. R. v. Bradford (i9o6, C. C. W. D. Mich.) 149 Fed. 492; see Wick-
wire v. Warner (1920, 4th Dept.) igI App. Div. 835, 182 N. Y. Supp. 165;
affirmed (1922) 233 N. Y. 572, 135 N. E. 923. This relief is in the sound discre-
tion of the court. i Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) sec. 221; 28
L. R. A. 577, note. The negotiation of notes issued without authority has been
enjoined. First National Bank v. Dodge Co. (1916, C. C. A. 9th) 233 Fed. 74;
affirmed (917) 26o Fed. 758. So where the note is void. Ritterhoff v. Puget
Sound Nat. Bank (9o5) 37 Wash. 76, 79 Pac. 6ol (forgery) ; contra: Erickson
v. First Nat. Bank (1895) 44 Neb. 622, 62 N. W. 1O78 (material alteration, but
under N. I. L. no longer absolutely void). In such cases, the remedy really safe-
guards primarily the possible holder in due course. Injunction has also been
granted where there has been a failure of consideration. Zeigler v. Beasley
(1871) 44 Ga. 57; Moomaw v. Fairview Cenetery Co. (1897, Va.) 27 S. E. 489.
Or breach of warranty. Atkinson v. Cain (1907) 61 W. Va. 355, 56 S. E. 519.
Or breach of contract, especially if the parties agreed not to negotiate the notes
until full performance. Bridger v. Brett (ii8) 176 N. C. 683, 97 S. E. 32;
Hilton v. Bathold Realty Corp., (1923, ist Dept.) 206 App. Div. 498. In the last
case there was no allegation of insolvency and the performance of the contract
was guaranteed. Insolvency is often a controlling, though not an essential, factor
in restraining the negotiation of the notes. Yount v. Setzer (1911) 155 N. C. 213,
71 S. E. 2o9; see Ruff v. Copeland (1911) 137 Ga. 56, 58, 72 S. E. 5o6; 2 High,
Injunctions (4th. ed. i9o5) sec. 1128. Other factors also influence the court to
grant equitable relief. Pere Marquette R. R. v. Bradford, supra (balance of
convenience) ; Zeigler v. Beasley, supra (to avoid multiplicity of suits) ; Ritter-
"hoff v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank, supra (to avoid harassment by suit and to
perpetuate testimony); contra: Aetna Explosives Co. v. Bassick (1917, Ist
Dept.) 176 App. Div. 577, 163 N. Y. Supp. 917 (mere convenience); see Warnock
Uniform Co. v. Garifolos (1915, Ist Dept.) 17o App. Div. 674, 156 N. Y. Supp.
637. The injunction does not destroy the negotiability of the instrument which
should be impounded to prevent transfer to a holder in due course. Winston v.
Westfeldt (1853) 22 Ala. 76o; Carroll County v. Smith (1884) III U. S. 556, 4
Sup. Ct. 539; 5o L. R. A. (N. s.) 871, note. The breach of warranty and the
fraudulent partial failure of consideration in the instant case seems to present a
suitable case for equitable relief. And the injunction offers the further benefit of
protecting the maker from the sometimes heavy financial burden of being out of
funds from the time he pays the instrument until he collects his indemnity. Cf.
Spencer, Suretyship (1913) sec. 177.
'CONSTITuTIoNAL LAw-PoLIcE PowER-LmuirATioN OF THE HEIGHT OF BUILD-
INGS.-Three actions were brought to test the validity of Wis. Laws, 1923, ch.
424, limiting the height of buildings throughout the state to ioo feet save in cities
of the first class (Milwaukee) where the limit is 125 feet, contending that it took
private property without compensation. One of the plaintiffs designed a building
ioo feet high and planned to add another story but did nothing further. Another
had entered into a contract for a i6-story building, of wliich eight stories were
already built. The third had obtained a permit to erect a building 115 feet high,
had torn down an old building, prepared plans, arranged for financing, but
incurred no further expense. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the act was
constitutional under the police power and should be applied to the first plaintiff;
but not to the second or (three judges dissenting) to the third because they had
RECENT CASE NOTES
altered vested rights in reliance on the existing law. Atkinson v. Piper (1923,
Wis.) 195 NI. W. 544.
Limitation of the height of buildings for purely osthetic purposes has not been
sustained under the police power. Piper v. Ekern (1923) 18o Wis. 586, 194 N. W.
159; see COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I7I; (923) 23 COL. L. REV.
682. But such a purpose may be accomplished by eminent domain. Attorney
General z. Williams (I899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77. And under the police
power if it is also necessary for the public health or safety. Welch v. Swasrey
(19o8) 2r4 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567; Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.
1911) sec. 696; see COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 833. The cases
generally have involved either local ordinances or laws affecting one particular
locality. Welch v. Swasey, supra; Cochran v. Preston (19o8) io8 Md. 220, 70 Atl.
113; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp. (192o) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E.
209. 'The instant case goes farther in sustaining a blanket law for the state. The
court suggests, that because a state may authorize cities to regulate the height of
buildings, it may accomplish the same result directly. But what may be a reason-
able and necessary regulation of private right in one community may be an
arbitrary abuse of power in another. Bonnet v. Vallier (19o8) 136 Wis. 193, 116
N. W. 885. The width of streets, the nature of the subsoil, the means of fire
protection, and the character of the transportation systems are important in
determining what is a reasonable regulation and any blanket statute is apt to be
unreasonable as to a large body of citizens throughout the state. If the decision
is to be supported, it must be on the familiar presumption of validity of the
legislative determination of necessity. Watertown v. Mayo (1872) 109 Mass.
315; Ex parte Quong Wo (1911) 161 Calif. 220, ii8 Pac. 714. Arid in any case
the statute is inapplicable as against persons who have acquired what the court
considers "vested" rights in reliance upon the existing law. Cf. Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (19o4) 195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18.
CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT TO SELL LIQUO-A sheriff to entrap the defen-
dant sent one McClung to buy liquor for him. The defendant had no liquor in
his possession but secured some for McClung who paid for it. The defendant
was convicted in the trial court of selling intoxicating liquor in violation of the
statute. On appeal he claimed as. error an instruction that the entrapment was
no defense and a refusal to instruct that, if the defendant was acting as the
agent of the buyer and not of the seller, he was'not guilty. Held, (two judges
dissenting) that the entrapment was no defense but that the cause should be
remanded for error in not giving the requested instruction. Whittington v. State
(1923, Ark.) 254 S. W. 532.
If the defendant has no prior intention of committing a crime and is induced
to do so by officers of the law or their agents, the entrapment is a defense to a
,prosecution. Shouquette v. State (923, Okla.) 219 Pac. 727; see Butts v. United
States (1921, C. C. A. 8th) 273 Fed. 35; NoTEs (1924) 4 VA. L. Rlv. (N. S.) 319.
But an inducement to do what the officers reasonably believe the accused would
do voluntarily is never a defense. Chicago v. Brendecke (x912) 170 Ill. App. 25;
Hummelshime v. State (915) 125 Md. 568, 93 Atl. 99. This is true even if the
inducement was solely for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant. Goldstein
v. United States (1919, C. C. A. 7th) 256 Fed. 813. Colorado cases to the con-
trary seems to be in the nature of civil actions by cities to recover penalties for
violation of ordinances prohibiting the sale of liquor. Walton v. Canon City
(9oo) X4 Co1. App. 352, 59 Pac. 840; People v. Chipman (9o3) 31 Colo. 90,
71 Pac. ixo8. New York has even held that one who receives goods believing
them to be stolen has a valid defense if the owner of the goods has permitted the
supposed thief to take them. People v. Jaffe (igo6) 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169;
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but see People v. Dfu Veau, (1905, Ist Dept.) 104 App. Div. 381, 94 N. Y. Supp.
225. It is often said that if the acts of entrapment furnish a consent and if the
defendant's wrong is one for which consent is an excuse, there can be no con-
viction. People v. McCord (889) 76 Mich. 2oo, 42 N. W. iio6 (burglary);
State v. Loeb (1916, Mo.) 19o S. W. -99 (rape). But in such cases the
consent itself is the operative defense irrespective of the manner in which it
arises. See Love v. People (1896) i6o Ill. 5Ol, 43 N. E. 71o. rn the instant case
consent is immaterial. See Moss v. State (i9IO, Okla. Cr.) iii Pac. 95o. But
where the defendant acts as agent for the buyer, he cannot be convicted of selling
liquor. It is a question of fact whether he acts in good faith only for the buyer,
or merely pretends so to act as a subterfuge to evade the law. See Snead v. State
(0918) 134 Ark. 303, 203 S. W. 703.
EQUITY-CANcELLATION OF CONTRACTs-ADEQUAcy OF LEGAL REmEDY.-A life
insurance policy was incontestable after one year. Within the year -the insured
died and.the insurer brought suit in equity in the federal court for cancellation
of the policy for fraud at the inception of the contract. Thereafter, within the
year, the beneficiary brought an action at law on the policy which was removed
to the same court. By a supplemental bill the insurer sought to enjoin the action
at law. Held, (one judge dissenting) that it was the duty of the court to hear
the suit in equity first. Jefferson. Life Ins. Co. v. Keeton (1923, C. C. A. 4 th)
292 Fed. 53.
Fraud and illegality in the inception have always been defenses to an action
at law on a simple contract. Nevertheless, equity "cancelled" the contract, as the
evidence to establish the defence might be lost. Newman v. Pranco (1795, Exch.)
2 Anst. 519; Buxton v. Broadway (1878) 45 Conn. 54o. Some American courts
refused this relief, since the remedy at law was adequate and the evidence could
be preserved by a bill to perpetuate testimony. Allerton v. Belden (1872) 49
N. Y. 373. Others while normally giving relief refused it if an action at law had
been begun prior to the suit in equity, or even immediately afterward, as in the
principal case. Grand Chute v. Winegar (1872, U. S.) i5 Wall. 373; Hoare v.
Breniridge (1872) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 22. Some of the cases preferred the common
law action because it was more speedy, less costly, and allowed the evidence to
be taken orally,-reasons which do not apply to-day. Hoare v. Brenlridge, supra.
Since the Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat. at L. 1163) providing that suits in
equity shall not be sustained in any court of the United States in any case where
a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law, the federal courts have
refused to entertain suits for cancellation. Cable v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. (i9o3)
i9I U. S. 288, 24 Sup. Ct. 74; Bronson, v. Cook (1917, N. D. Ga.) 247 Fed. 6oi.
But they have given relief in the case of negotiable instruments which were in
danger of being transferred to a bona fide purchaser. Pere Marquette R. R. v.
Bradford (i9o6, C. C. W. D. Mich.) 149 Fed. 492. Or to prevent a multiplicity
of suits. Louisville Co. v. Ohio Co. (1893, C. C. D. Ky.) 57 Fed. 42; see (1924)
33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 553. The right to a trial by jury is often the main issue
especially in the insurance cases. But since the right to a jury trial is only
preserved as it was at common law, it seems that the jurisdiction of equity is not
unconstitutional in cases where the chancellor took jurisdiction from earliest
times. U. S. Const. Amend. VII. The instant case is probably the type in which
it is more desirable to have the evidence passed up.on by a jury, but the court
thought the legal remedy inadequate on the ground that the defense would be
lost at the end of the year because of the incontestable clause. Perhaps the better
rule is that the clause ceases to be operative at the death of the insured. Jefferson
Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre (1922, S. D. Fla.) 285 Fed. 570; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Stevens (1923, Minn.) 195 N. W. 913. Such a rule would lead to a contrary decision
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on the question of equity jurisdiction. And the danger that the beneficiary might
dismiss his legal action and deprive the defendant of its defense could be met
by the suggested rule that there is no right to dismiss where it would cause
prejudice to the other party. See Stevens v. The Railroads (i88o, C. C. W. D.
Tenn.) 4 Fed. 97.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION TO ABATE A NUISANCE-OVERHANGING STaUcrTa.-The
defendant's building, six years after construction, was discovered to have tipped so
as to encroach two inches in the space above the plaintiffs' premises, and press
against their building. Despite notice to the defendant, he took no action and
the encroachment progressively increased for almost five years. Actions for tres-
pass to real property were required to be brought within three years, and those to
recover possession within five. Calif. C. C. P. 1872, secs. 318 and 338. The
plaintiff sought an injunction, and appealed from a judgment for the defendant.
Held, reversing the judgment, that the encroachment was a continuing trespass and
nuisance, giving rise to successive causes of action until abated, and that the plain-
tiff's remedy was not barred by the statute of limitations. Kafka v. Bozio (1923,
Calif.) 218 Pac. 753.
By the modern view the extent of a landowner's interest in the air above his land
is merely a privilege of reasonable user. Pollock, Torts (llth ed. 1920) 351;
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 402, 403. Trespass for an interference with possession lies
for an invasion above but near the surface. Hannabalson v. Sessions (19o2) 116
Iowa, 457, 9o N. W. 93. Where the encroachment is more than transitory, some
courts allow ejectment, based on the sheriff's power to remove the offending
structure. Rasch v. Noth (1898) 99 Wis. 285, 74 N. W. 820; Butler v. Frontier
Tel. Co. (19o6) 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716; COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 265. Others regard it as only an interference for which a petition in
equity to abate a nuisance is the suitable remedy. Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins.
Co. (I9o, Ist Dept.) 61 App. Div. 226, 7o N. Y. Supp. 492; Norwalk H. & L.
Co. v. Vernam (1903) 75 Conn. 662; 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) lOO, note; I Tiffany,
Real Property (2d ed. I92O) 864, 865. The importance of the distinction becomes
apparent in cases of continuous or "recurring" trespass. Some states permit
successive actions, and a prescriptive right is not acquired at the expiration of the
term for the recovery of possession. See Hunt v. Iowa Cent. R. R. (1892) 86
Iowa, 15, 52 N. W. 668; Peck v. City of Michigan (1898) 149 Ind. 670, 683, 49
N. E. 8oo, 804. Generally, successive actions are allowed only when the injury
is not "permanent," and future damages are incapable of assessment. St. Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. v. Anderson (1896) 62 Ark. 360, 364, 35 S. W. 791; Ridley v.
Seaboard R. R. (1896) 118 N. C. 996, 24 S. E. 730. Legislative sanction of the
encroachment, its character, and the inability of the tort feasor to repair the injury
without committing another trespass have been used by the courts as tests of
"permanence." Troy v. Cheshire R. R. (851) 23 N. H. 83; Kansas Pacific Ry.
v. Mihlman (1876) 17 Kan. 224; (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 240. Where
the injury is held not to be "permanent," recovery may be had for the damage
within the statutory period applicable, but not for prior damage. Knapp v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1903) 76 Conn. 311, 56 Atl. 512. The majority of states
allow a prescriptive right dating from the original delict, and all causes of action
for damages thereafter arising out of the maintenance of the encroachment are
barred. James v. City of Kansas (1884) 83 Mo. 567; Valley Ry. v. Franz (885)
43 Ohio St. 623, 4 N. E. 88; io L. R. A. 2IO, note; 2 Wood, Limitations (4th ed.
igi6) 846. There seems no reason, however, why causes of action arising before
the expiration of the prescriptive period should not remain. See I Wood, op. cit.
327. Where the injury is progressively increasing, the right is only to maintain
the encroachment as it was at the inception of the prescriptive period. Western
Union Tel. Co v. Moyle (1893) 51 Kan. 203, 32 Pac. 895; see Thompson v. Penn-
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sylvania Ry. (1888) 45 N. J. Eq. 870, 14 At. 897. Since the instant case was a
suit in equity the court might have balanced the convenience before restraining the
defendant, who had not yet acquired a prescriptive right. But as the plaintiffs
were gradually being entirely deprived of the enjoyment of their land, without
commensurate benefit to the defendant or society, the injunction properly issued.
See NOTES (1922) 36 HARv. L. REv. 211; (923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 205.
LEGAL ETHIcs-DISBARMENT FOR FRAUD-SEcURING DISMISSAL BY MISREPRp-
SENTATION TO THE CouRT.-The defendant, an attorney, defended a suit in which
there were three opposing counsel of record. A fourth counsel engaged by the
plaintiff in that suit after the commencement of the action, did not enter his name
as counsel, but filed written pleadings.and argued a motion, so that the defendant
knew he had actually superseded the counsel of record. The defendant gave
notice of a proposed order to the counsel of record only, and by representation
to the master that the fourth counsel was not in the case, obtained an order
dismissing the action. Disbarment proceedings were brought against the defend-
ant. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the defendant was guilty of professional
misconduct, and should be disbarred. People v. Brillow (1923, IIl.) i4o N. E. 829.
The power to disbar an attorney for professional misconduct is cautiously
exercised, and only upon grounds which would render his continuance in practice
subversive of the proper administration of justice. Wernimont v. State (1911)
IOI Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194. Where a fraud is wilfully imposed upon the court,
the penalty is dependent upon the seriousness of the charge and the circumstances
of each particular case. Where a merely misleading affidavit was introduced,
the penalty was limited to suspension. In re Wagener (914, ist Dept.) I61 App.
Div. 546, 146 N. Y. Supp. 589. Similarly for concealing evidence. In re Lane
(19o4) 93 Minn. 425, ioi N. W. 613. On the other hand, the introduction of evidence
known to be false has been held ground for disbarment. In re Shapiro (I9I1,
Ist Dept.) I44 App. Div. I, 128 N. Y. Supp. 852; (1911) II CoL. L. REV. 589.
For example, the presentation of affidavits known to be false. In re Wharton
(896) 114 Calif. 367, 46 Pac. 172; In re Duncan (igo8) 81 S. C. 290, 62 S. E.
4o6. Or the adoption of false evidence in summing up. In re Palmieri (I916,
ist Dept.) 172 App. Div. 954, 162 N. Y. Supp. 799; (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 642.
Manufacturing evidence for a divorce is ground for disbarment. Matter of
Herrmann (1916, 1st Dept.) 175 App. Div. 31o, 16I N. Y. Supp. 977. Or fraudu-
lently obtaining an extension of time for appeal. Matter of Cebulsky (1915, ist
Dept.) 169 App. Div. 636, r55 N. Y. Supp. 463. Or fraudulently obtaining a judg-
ment by default. People v. Hooper (9o5) 218 Ill. 313, 75 N. E. 896. It is not
necessary that the court be actually deceived, as the gravamen of the offense is
the attorney's intent. Matter of Goodman (1913, Ist Dept.) 158 App. Div. 465,
143 N. Y. Supp. 577. In the instant case the fraud upon the opposing counsel
as well as upon the court well warranted the disbarment.
PARTNERSHIP-INFANT PARTNER-POWER TO DISAFFIRM AND RECOVER PREMIUM
OR CONTRIBUTIOi.-At the solicitation of an adult, an infant purchased a half
interest in the former's cafe. After two months, the infant discovered it was a
losing business, disaffirmed the contract of partnership, and sued the adult to
recover the purchase price. Held, that he could recover. Thomas V. Banks
(1923, Mich.) 195 N. W. 94.
An infant may become a partner and as such is entitled to full rights and
powers over the property of the partnership. Parker v. Oakley (Igoo, Tenn. Ch.)
57 S. W. 426; Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2d ed. 192o) sec.
49. He may choose during minority to disaffirm the contract of partnership, and
thereby avoid all personal liability both to the firm creditors, and to the adult
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partner for contribution for losses. Folds v. Allardt (1886) 35 Minn. 488, 29
N. W. 2or; Burdick, Partnership (3d ed. 1917) 96. The question then arises
whether he can recover his premium to the adult partner for the privilege of
entering, or his contribution to the partnership funds. It is well settled that his
contribution remains primarily liable for firm debts. Hill v. Bell (1892) III MO.
35, 19 S. W. 959. Where creditors are not involved, however, it seems that
recovery of either premium or contribution should rest on the established prin-
ciples governing executed contracts between adult and infant. Ordinarily, the
infant may recover the consideration paid without a tender of the consideration
received. Gillis v. Goodwin (igoi) 18o Mass. I4o, 61 N. E. 813. This is true
even if he has wasted the received consideration. Dawson v. Helines (1882) 30
Minn. 107, 14 N. W. 462; First National Bank v. Casey (1912) 158 Iowa, 349,
138 N. W. 897. But the hardship on the adult has induced a few courts to allow
the infant to recover only if he puts the other party in stati quo. Holnes v. Blogg
(1818, C. P.) 8 Taunt. 5o8; Rice v. Butler (1889) i6o N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275.
The English courts early refused to allow the infant to recover from the adult
partner in the absence of fraud. Ex parte Taylor (1856, Ch.) 8 De Gex, M. & G.
254 (premium). This seems to be the prevailing American rule. Page v. Morse
(i88o) 128 Mass. 99 (contribution) ; Adams v. Beall (1887) 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664
(premium) ; Burdick, op. cit. 99. But some courts, recognizing that this is a
departure from the ordinary contract rule, haire allowed recovery irrespective of
fraud. Sparman z. Keim (i88o) 83 N. Y. 245 (contribution); Kuipers v. Thome
(913) 182 Ill. App. 28 (premium). Where the rights of third parties have not
intervened, it seems that the protection with which the infant is customarily
clothed should not be relaxed in this type of case.
PLEADING-NEGLIGENcE-GENERAL ALLEGATION GooD AGAINST GENERAL DEMUR-
RER.-In a personal injury action the complaint after alleging that plaintiff was
a lawful traveler on the highway exercising due care, alleged that the defendant
carelessly and negligently operated his automobile, and it collided with the
defendant and injured him. No specific acts of negligence were alleged. The
defendant demurred. Held, that the complaint was sufficient as against a general
demurrer. Couture v. Gauthier (1923, Me.) 122 Atd. 54.
At common law a general allegation of negligence was the usual form of the
declaration in case. 2 Chitty, Pleadings (16th ed. 1879) 574. Under code pro-
visions, however, a plain and concise statement of the facts is required. N. Y.
C. C. P. sec. 481 (2). By the great weight of authority an averment that
the defendant acted "negligently" is good against a general demurrer. Seaboard
Air Line R. R. v. Good (192o) 79 Fla. 589, 84 So. 733; Bliss, Code Pleading
(3d ed. 1894) sec. 211 (a). And in any case its sufficiency cannot be questioned
after issue joined. Freedman v. Denhalter Bottling Co. (1919) 54 Utah, 513,
182 Pac. 843. But it is usually subject to a motion to make more specific. Ander-
son v. Denison Clay Co. (1919) 1O4 Kan. 766, i8o Pac. 797; Van Bibber v. Will-
man Fruit Co. (1921, Mo. App.) 234 S. W. 356. Or a special demurrer for want
of definiteness. Silvia v. Scotten (192i, Del. Super. Ct.) 114 At. 206; contra:
Saylor v. Taylor (I919) 42 Calif. App. 474, 183 Pac. 843. But if the facts are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff will not be required
to set them up specifically. Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Traop (1920) 19o Ind.
35, 128 N. E. 4oi; Bliss, op. cit. sec. 31oa. The plaintiff may set up the specific
acts showing negligence without characterizing them as such. Metcalf v. Mellon
(920) 57 Utah, 44, 192 Pac. 676. In such a case he will be confined in his
proof to the acts set up. New England Fruit & Produce Co. v. Director General
(1922) 97 Conn. 225, 116 Ati. 243. This is so even if a general allegation of negli-
gence is also included. last Tennessee Coal Co. v. Daniel (1897) ioo Tenn. 65,
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42 S. W. 1O62; but see Mezzi v. Taylor (1923) 99 Conn. i. And if the specific
acts alleged do-not state a cause of action, the complaint is demurrable in spite
of the general allegation. Fuller v. Illinois Cent. R. R. (I91o) 138 Ky. 42, 127
S. W. 5O. It seems reasonable that the general allegation of negligence should
be held sufficient even against a motion to make more specific, unless it appears
that the defendant has actually no notice of the facts. See COMMENTS (1923)
32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 483, 489.
PROPERTY-LICENSES-REvOCABILITY AFTER EXPENDITURES BY LICENSEE.-The
defendant's grantor orally allowed the plaintiff to place pipes under his land for
the purpose of conveying steam and water to the plaintiff's mill. The defendant
bought the land with knowledge that the plaintiff had expended considerable
money in reliance on the license. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction to pre-
vent the defendant from removing the pipes. Held, that a permanent injunction
be granted, since the license when executed became irrevocable. Leininger v.
Goodman (1923, Pa.) I2o Atl. 772.
The defendant's grantor orally granted the plaintiff the perpetual use of his
well in consideration of the use of the plaintiff's water pressure for his mill.
The defendant bought the land with knowledge that the plaintiff had constructed
waterworks in reliance, and that the agreement had been acted upon by both
parties for over twenty years. He further acquiesced in the user for two years
and then demanded paymnent for the water taken during this period threatening
to shut off the water unless his claim was paid. The plaintiff prayed for an
injunction. Held, that the order below granting the injunction be reversed, since
the license was revocable. City of Hutchinson v. Wegner (1923, Minn.) i95
N. W. 535.
It is said to be a question of fact in each case whether the parties intend to
create a mere privilege with regard to land (revocable license) or a privilege
plus an immunity from revocation (irrevocable easement). Hohfeld, Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions (1923) i6o. If the intent was to create an easement,
expenditures or substantial improvements made in reliance are sufficient to make
the contract enforceable. Alderman v. New Haven (19o8) 81 Conn. 137, 70 Atl.
626; Clendenin v. White (1923, Calif. App.) 217 Pac. 761. Even where. a
license is intended, affirmative conduct of the licensor inducing expenditures
by the licensee is ground for an estoppel against revocation. Metcalf v. Hart
(189) 3 Wyo. 514, 27 Pac. 9oo; Arthur Irrigation Co. v. Strayer (191i) 5o
Colo. 371, 115 Pac. 724; Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 74, note; see (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 6o6. But by the general rule expenditures by the licensee do not give
him an immunity from revocation where the licensor has merely "stood by."
McIntyre v. Harty (19o8) 236 Ill. 629, 86 N. E. 581 ; Davis v. Martin (1910) 157
Calif. 657, io8 Pac. 866; 49 L. R. A. 497, note. This may be so even where the
license has been "executed," that is, acted on by the licensee. Pifer v. Brown
(1897) 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S. E. 399. Whether the licensor has merely "stood by"
or whether he has induced expenditures in reliance is again a question of fact;
hence the seeming conflict in the decisions. See Clark, Licenses in Real Property
Law (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 757. The growing tendency to enforce irrevocability
finds an even stronger analogy in the doctrine that a promise to make a gift of
land will be held specifically enforceable where in reliance the donee has been
induced to make expenditures. Messiah Home for Children v. Rogers (I914)
212 N. Y. 315, io6 N. E. 59. It seems that there was adequate ground for a
specific enforcement of the contract in the Minnesota case. Furthermore, such
a contract has been treated as one for the sale of personalty, and so not within
the statute of frauds. See Mettlow Cattle Co. v. Williain ' (1911) 64 Wash. 457,
117 Pac. 239 (irrigation ditch). The Pennsylvania decision is more consonant
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with equitable principles in preventing an undue hardship on the licensee. See
also McLure v. Koen (1898) 25 Colo. 284, 53 Pac. o58; Shaw v. Profitt (igiO)
57 Or. 192, II0 Pac. io92.
QUASI-CONTRACrs-REcOVERY OF PAYMENT TO THiRD PARTY-MISTAKEN Duiy
To FORGm.-The plaintiff loaned money on an instrument fraudulently represented
to be a first mortgage. Part of the money loaned was paid directly to the
defendant to cancel a debt due from the person guilty of the fraud. Neither
plaintiff nor defendant then knew of the fraud. The plaintiff secured a judg-
ment for the amount so paid, and the defendant appealed. Held, that there
should be no recovery. N. Y. Title & Mortgage Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co. (1923, Ist Dept. App. Div.) 2o N. Y. Supp. 529.
Payments induced by fraud or mistake of fact may generally be recovered.
Bradshaw v. Glasscock (913) 9i Kan. II, 136 Pac. 933; Prowinsky v. Bank
(1920) 49 App. D. C. 363, 265 Fed. IOO3. But where the payee uses the payment
to discharge a bona fide debt to an innocent third party, the original payer cannot
recover from such third party. Holly v. Episcopal Church (i899, C. C. A. 2d)
92 Fed. 745; Russell v. Richard and Thalheimer (i912) 6 Ala. App. 73, 61 So. 8i 9 .
And the same rule applies where the payment is made directly to the third party
in behalf of the fraudulent party. Merchants" Insurance Co. v. Abbott (i88i)
131 Mass. 397; Aiken v. Short (I856, Exch.) i H. & N. 2o9; L. R. A. 1918 C,
177, note; contra: Strauss v. Hensey (1896) 9 App. D. C. 541. Whether such
direct payment is by check or by cash is immaterial. Swift v. Tyson (1842,
U. S.) i6 Pet. i; Hatch v. Fourth National Bank (1895) 147 N. Y. 184, 41 N. E.
403. A contrary result is reached in some jurisdictions, where the third party
is the payee of negotiable paper which comes into his hands indirectly through
the fraudulent party. 15 A. L. R- 437, note; 21 ibid. 1365, note. Another class
of cases denies recovery where the third party has in reliance on the payment
altered his position to his detriment. Walker v. Conant (1888) 69 Mich. 321, 37
N. W. 292; see Guild v. Baldridge (1852, Tenn.) 2 Swan, 295. The instant
case falls within the former rule and follows the general current of New York
authority, although the earlier cases are not uniform in their concept of "value."
Lawrence v. Bank (1873) 54 N. Y. 432; Ball v. Shepard (1911) 202 N. Y. 297,
95 N. E. 719.
SALES-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ACCEPTANCE OF GOODS BY AGENT OF THE BU -
Pursuant to an oral contract, the plaintiff shipped goods to the defendant. -A
truckman who had general instructions from the defendant to receive all freight
consigned to him, paid the freight charges and stored the goods in the defendant's
cellar. Within a reasonable time after learning of the receipt of the goods, the
defendant repudiated the sale and notified the plaintiff that the goods were held
to his order. In an action for the purchase price, the verdict was for the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed from a judgment on the verdict, contending
that there was conclusive evidence of acceptance. Held, that the judgment be
affirmed. Burlington Grocery v. Greggs (1923, Vt.) 122 Atl. 479.
Where a buyer assumes dominion over goods in a way inconsistent with an
intent to reject them, there is an acceptance sufficient to take the contract out of the
statute of frauds. Wyler v. Rothchild (i898) 53 Neb. 566, 74 N. W. 41 (execu-
tion of chattel mortgage); Rea Implement Co. v. Smith (1912) 167 Mo. App. iig,
i5I S. W. 203 (exchange for other goods); Isaacson v. Blum (1919, App. T.)
178 N. Y. Supp. 333 (actual use of part). And some acts or conduct of the
buyer raise a strong inference of an acceptance, which, however, may be explained.
Bicknell v. Owyhee Sheep and Land Co. (1918) 31 Idaho, 696, 176 Pac. 782
(offer to resell); Godkin v. Weber (19o8) 154 Mich. 2o7, 114 N. W. 924 (reten-
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tion longer than necessary for inspection). Acceptance may be by parol state-
ments. Wilson v. Hotchkiss (1915) 171 Calif. 617, 154 Pac. I. It has been held
that an acceptance before the contract is concluded is a sufficient acceptance
within the statute of frauds. Tonkelson v. Malis (i922, App. T.) 119 Misc. 717,
197 N. Y. Supp. 309. Such an acceptance is possible even though the goods have
to be weighed and measured to determine the price. Ruediger v. Dennis (igi8)
I99 Mo. App. io2, 2O S. W. 943. A few courts hold that there can be no
acceptance of goods of a fhingible nature where they are still 'to be selected from
a mass. Crawley v. Mandill (1922, N. H.) iiS Atl. 673; cf. contra: Kimberly
v. Patchin (859) i9 N. Y. 330; Sales Act, secs. 4 (3), 6. Acceptance of a
sample is sufficient, if taken from the bulk so as to diminish the quantity.
Dierson v. Petersneyer (I899) i09 Iowa, 233, 8o N. W. 389; see Cleveland
Worsted Mills v. Brownstone Co. (1921, App. T.) I9o N. Y. Supp. 6oi. Where
the acceptance is by agent, he must be authorized to accept. Houghton Dutton
Co. v. Engraving Co. (1922) 241 Mass. 541, 135 N. E. 688. Such authority is not
implied from'an authority to receive. Spedding v. Griggs Co. (1917) 196 Mich.
571, 162 N. W. 956. The instant case, overruling a previous Vermont decision,
is in line with the prevailing view that a carrier hired to receive goods is not
ipso facto authorized to accept. Strong Whitney Co. v. Dodds (1875) 47 Vt.
348. See 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1038, note.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-USE OF SIMILAR PERSONAL NAMES.--The Carter Electric
Company, a corporation, filed a petition in equity asking that W. B. Carter and
S. E. Carter be enjoined from forming a corporation under the name of W. B.
Carter Electric Company. No fraud, deception, or misrepresentation was shown.
Held, that the injunction should be denied. Carter v. Carter Electric Co. (1923,
Ga.) 119 S. E. 737.
Every person has the privilege of using his own name honestly in his own busi-
ness, though he may thereby incidentally injure the business of another having the
same name. Silver Laundry Co. v. Silver (1917, Mo. App.) 195 S. W. 529;
Burdick, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1913) sec. 474. But he may not fraudulently repre-
sent his goods as those of the other. Robinson v. Storm (1899) 103 Tenn. 40, 52
S. W. 88o. And where the name has become closely associated with products of
the older firm and has thereby acquired a secondary meaning akin to a trademark,
he must take affirmative measures to indicate that neither he nor his products are
connected with it. Allegretti v. Allegretti Chocolate-Cream Co. (1898) 177 Ill.
129, 52 N. E. 487; Chickering v. Chickering & Sons (1914, C. C. A. 7th) 215
Fed. 49o. Where in selling a business one contracts away the exclusive privilege
of using his name, he is precluded from setting up a competing business under that
name. Russia Cement Co. v. LePage (1888) 147 Mass. 2o6, 17 N. E. 304; Zagier
v. Zagier (1914) 67 N. C. 616, 83 S. E. 913. Clear intent to divest himself of
the privilege, however, must be shown. Wright Restaurant Co. v. Wright (1913)
74 Wash. 23o, 133 Pac. 464; Guth Chocolate Co. v. Guth (1914, Md.) 215 Fed.
75o, affirmed (1915, C. C. A. 4th) 224 Fed. 932. In any event, no injunction will
be kranted unless there is actual competition. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney
& Co. (Igi6, E. D. N. Y.) 234 Fed. 8o4. Similar rules apply to corporations using
the personal name of someone connected with it Bissell Chilled Plow Works v.
T. M. Bissell Plow Co. (Igo2 .W. D. Mich.) 121 Fed. 357; Elize Costume
Co. v. Mine. Elize (1923, Ist Dept) 2o6 App. Div. 503, 201 N. Y. Supp. 545. But
the courts scrutinize such transactions more carefully. Thus where a person was
taken into a firm for the sole purpose of using his name in competition with
another corporation having the same name, its use was enjoined. Van Dyk Co. v.
F. V. Reilly Co. (1911, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 73 Misc. 87, 13o N. Y. Supp. 755.
Ordinarily, even in the absence of good faith, equity will not enjoin all use of a
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trade name, but merely restrict its use so as to furnish reasonable protection to
the older concern. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co. (1914) 235 U. S.
88, 35 Sup. Ct. 91; World's Dispensary Medical Assoc. v. Pierce (1911) 203 N. Y.
419, 96 N. E. 738. Nor will equity require proof that the public was actually
deceived if, in fact, deception is likely to result. W. F. & John Barnes Co. v.
Van Dyck-Churchill Co. (1913, S. D. N. Y.) 2o7 Fed. 855, affirmed (1914, C. C. A.
2d) 213 Fed. 637. While the courts profess to protect the public, it is in reality
the plaintiff's rights that are enforced. Exact identity of names is not necessary
if they are strikingly'similar. McLean v. Fleming (1877) 96 U. S. 245 (McLane) ;
Stuart v. F. G. Stewart Co. (1899, C. C. A. 7th) 91 Fed. 243. In the instant case
no hardship could be shown other than mere confusion resulting from the similarity
of names, and the court soundly refused an injunction.
WORKME, N'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ON" WAY To WoRI NOT IN COURSE OF
EmPLOYMENT.-The defendant gave to its employees the privilege of travelling to
and from its mines at reduced rates. A pass was issued to each employee, the
amount of the transportation charges deducted weekly from the men's salary, and
an agreement signed by which the men released the railway company from all
liability in case of accident. The trains were owned and operated by the railway
company. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant corporation, was injured
while on his way to work and sued for recovery under the Compensation Act.
The Court of Appeal held that the injury arose in the course of employment and
allowed compensation. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be reversed.
St. Helens Colliery Co. v. Hewitson (1923, H. L.) 40 T. L. R. 125.
Ordinarily an employer is not liable for injuries sustained by an employee while
travelling to and from the place of employment. Hills v. Blair (1914) 182 Mich.
2o, 148 N. W. 243. 'But this is not true of all injuries sustained off the employer's
premises. Thus an injury sustained on the only accessible approach to the place
of employment was compensated. In re Sundine (1914) 218 Mass. 1, IO5 N. E.
433; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore (1924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 153. And so
where the employee was on his way to work in a vehicle owned by his employer.
Donovan 's Case (1914) 217 Mass. 76, lO4 N. E. 431; Tallon v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. (192o, Ist Dept.) 193 App. Div. 772, 184 N. Y. Supp. 588. But the
majority in the instant case would have denied compensation even had the defendant
owned the trains since the plaintiff was performing no duty owing to the defendant
at the time the injury was sustained. The cases, however, do not seem to support
this view. Thus an employee injured while on his way to work in a truck hired
by the employer to carry the men to the place of employment, was allowed compen-
sation. Matter of Littler v. Fuller (1918) 223 N. Y. 369, 119 N. E. 554. And
so where the employee was going home in a rowboat furnished by his master.
Richards v. Morris [1915, C. A.] I K. B. 221. And where the workman was walk-
ing home on his employer's railroad bed. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion (1920) 294 Ill. 119, 128 N. E. 29o. Similarly where an employee on a ship
fell off the dock while returning to the ship. John Stewart & Son v. Longworth
[1917, H. L.] A. C. 249. It seems that an injury arises in the course of employ-
ment if the employee is at the time exercising a privilege peculiarly incidental
to the contract of service. A fortiori should compensation have been allowed
when the privilege of using the trains was, as pointed out by the dissent, an
express part of the contract of service.
